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NOTES

TORTS-Corporate Negligence -

Wisconsin Hospi-

tal Held to Owe a Duty to Its Patients to Select Qualified Physicians. Johnson v. Misericordia Community
Hospital, 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Johnson v. MisericordiaCommunity Hospital" the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a hospital owes a duty to its
2
patients to use due care in the selection of its medical staff.
Relying on the theory of "corporate negligence," the court
found that a hospital has a direct obligation to its patients to
select and maintain qualified members of its medical staff to
insure quality care, diagnosis and treatment of its patients.
The adoption of corporate negligence significantly expands
the independent legal duty of hospitals.3 Historically, Wisconsin hospitals were exempt from tort liability under the judicial
doctrine of charitable immunity until the 1961 decision of
Kojis v. Doctors Hospital4 abrogated this rule. Even then a
hospital was liable for the negligence of a physician only
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. No independent
1. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
2. In common parlance, the medical staff can include both salaried physicians and
private physicians who bill their patients directly.
3. The application of the Misericordia decision is limited to private hospitals.
Sovereign immunity might still shield state or municipal hospitals from tort liability.
4. 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961). The doctrine of charitable immunity
for hospitals derives from Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng.
Rep. 1508 (1846). The rule was rejected in most United States jurisdictions following
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942). This latter view is adopted in the RESTATEMENT (SE.coND) oF ToRTS § 895E
(1965): "One engaged in a charitable, educational, religious or benevolent enterprise
or activity is not for that reason immune from tort liability." Even so, for many years
courts refused to impose any liability for the acts of salaried hospital employees, particularly doctors. See Schioendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 105
N.E. 92 (1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). See
also Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff
Members: "Am I My Brother'sKeeper?" 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 27, 28-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Copeland].
5. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), recognized
respondeat superior in overturning Schloendorff, supra note 4. Subsequent cases em-
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duty of care regarding the acts of an independent contractor
physician was imposed upon the hospital.
In addition to recognizing a hospital's independent duty to
its patients the Misericordia court also set forth guidelines for
a standard of care to be observed by Wisconsin hospitals. This
note will review the historical development of the theory of
corporate negligence. The future use of the theory will then be
reviewed in light of the standard of care set forth by the
court.
Misericordiawas a negligence action brought by a patient
of the defendant hospital for harm sustained during a surgical
procedure performed by a private staff physician. The plaintiff's complaint named both the physician and the hospital as
defendants in the subsequent malpractice suit. After a trial,
the jury apportioned twenty percent of the causal negligence
to the doctor and eighty percent to the hospital. Damages
were awarded in the sum of $315,000 for personal injuries,
past and future, and $90,000 for impairment of earning capacity, past and future.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld this decision on
the theory of corporate negligence,6 finding that Misericordia
had breached an independent legal duty owed to the plaintiffpatient. This duty was to exercise "that degree of care and
skill usually exercised or maintained by other reputable hospitals in similar situations."'7 On May 12, 1981, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed."
H11. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE
As rapidly as the services of the modern hospital have exploying this doctrine generally follow the principles set forth in W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 at 458-59 and § 70 at 460-61 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATENTr (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8,220, 250 (1957). For a further discussion see
Zaremski & Spitz, Liability of a Hospital as an Institution:Are the Walls of Jericho
Tumbling? 16 FORUM 225, 226 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Zaremski & Spitz], and
Comment, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution to Controlling Private Physician Incompetence? 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 342, 358 n.117 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Effective Solution].

6. 97 Wis. 2d 521, 530, 294 N.W.2d 501, 506 (1980), aff'd, 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301
N.W.2d 156 (1981). The court of appeals used the term "corporate negligence" in the
body of its opinion, while the supreme court included it in a footnote. 99 Wis. 2d at
722 n.14, 301 N.W.2d at 163 n.14.
7. 97 Wis. 2d at 544, 294 N.W.2d at 513.
8. 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
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panded, so too have its legal duties. In 1965, the hospital's
world changed drastically when the Illinois Supreme Court
decided Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital' and the United States Congress enacted Medicare.1 Darling extended the duty of a private hospital to include supervision of a staff physician, while the Medicare legislation
imposed federal standards on those hospitals which wished to
qualify to care for medicare patients. In Darling, the patient
brought an action for damages against the hospital for injuries
stemming from emergency room treatment of his broken leg.
The general practitioner on call at the hospital had applied a
plaster cast which impaired circulation. Within fourteen days
so much dead tissue had accumulated in the leg that it had to
be amputated below the knee. At trial the plaintiff contended
that the physician had done nothing in the thirty-three years
since he had graduated from medical school to update his
skills to perform such a procedure, so that the hospital was
negligent for hiring him for such a position. Mr. Darling also
alleged that the hospital was negligent in failing to exercise
adequate supervision over the case and in failing to require a
consultation after complications developed.
The Illinois Appellate Court 1 found that the hospital had
breached three duties it owed the patient directly, including
(1) using reasonable care to see that only board eligible or
board certified12 surgeons were allowed to perform orthopedic
surgery; (2) requiring consultations with members of the hospital staff skilled in the techniques involved; and (3) maintaining a sufficient staff of nurses to watch and report on the
patient's condition."' The Illinois Supreme Court " in affirming this decision made no holding on the first ground of
judging a physician's competence, but it did not overrule it
either, and subsequent decisions have more readily found a
9. 33 IlM. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
11. 50 Il1. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), af'd, 33 IlM. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
12. In order to be board eligible in a speciality, a physician must have completed
a required residency. A board certified specialist is one who has both completed the
training and passed a standard examination.
13. 50 Ill. App. 2d at -, 200 N.E.2d at 257-61.
14. 33 IlM. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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duty of the hospital to screen staff appointments than to supervise the medical acts of physicians. In delineating this duty
of the hospital the court said that community standards in
other hospitals were not solely determinative, but that the defendant hospital's own bylaws should be considered along
with the standards and practices of agencies and organizations
to which the hospital belongs.
The holding of Darling is actually rather limited. Hospital
management has the responsibility in consultation with the
organized medical staff to make reasonably certain that physicians working in their institution are not likely to commit
malpractice. 15 Thus the theory of corporate negligence is quite
distinguishable from that of respondeat superior. The former
involves an independent, nondelegable duty while the latter
makes the hospital vicariously responsible for any breach of
duty committed by its professional servants.1 6
The Connecticut Supreme Court aptly described corporate
negligence as follows: "Corporate negligence is the failure of
those entrusted with the task of providing the accomodations
and facilities necessary to carry out the charitable purpose of
the corporation, to follow in a given situation the established
standard of conduct to which the corporation should conform. 1 7 The seminal article on the subject of hospital corporate negligence was written by Arthur Southwick three years
after the Darling decision. In his article he defined the limits
of the theory in the following way:
In corporate negligence, although human error is involved,
the hospital itself as an entity or as an institution, is negligent and liability attaches directly to the hospital. In other
words, the hospital owes a duty directly to the patient and
these duties are non-delegable to the medical staff or to
other professional personnel.18
Southwick and other commentators'

list four general du-

15. See Copeland, supra note 4, at 32-33.
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965). See also W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 468-72 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, -,
172 A.2d 192, 194

(1961).
18. Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLE.-MAR. L. REV. 146,
152 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Southwick].
19. See generally Copeland, supra note 4; Horty & Mulholland, The Legal Status
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ties which attach to a hospital under this doctrine: (1) the
duty owed to all invitees to exercise reasonable care with respect to the maintenance of buildings and grounds; (2) the
duty to exercise reasonable care with respect to the selection
and maintenance of equipment; (3) the duty to exercise reasonable care with regard to the selection and retention of personnel; and (4) the duty to supervise the personnel within the
scope of their employment. The Misericordia decision clearly
adopts the third category and, in dicta, also appears to adopt
the fourth. This is consistent with the trend in other states.
To date over one-quarter of the states have adopted the concept of corporate negligence for selection or supervision of
20
staff.
While the Darling opinion was limited to the hospital's
duty to supervise, the court in Misericordiaheld the hospital
of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485 (1978); Lisko, HospitalLiability Under Theories of Respondeat Superior and CorporateNegligence, 47 U. Mo. L.
REv. 171 (1978); Rapp, Darlingand Its Progeny:A RadicalApproach Toward Hospital Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 883 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Rapp]; Southwick, The
Hopsital as an Institution - Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship
with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. Rv. 429 (1973); Southwick, supra note 18;
Spero, Hospital Liability, 15 TRIAL 22 (1979); Zaremski, Hospital CorporateLiability: The Walls Continue to Tumble, 1981 MEDicOLEGAL NEWS 13; Zaremski & Spitz,
supra note 5; Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician - An Expanding
Duty of Care, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 249 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Expanding
Duty]; Comment, The Hospital'sResponsibility for Its Medical Staff: Prospects for
CorporateNegligence in California,8 PAC. L.J. 141 (1977); Effective Solution, supra
note 5; Comment, Hospital Liabilityfor the Negligence of Physicians:Some Needed
Legal Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 844 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Needed Legal Sutures]; Comment, The Hospital-PhysicianRelationship:Hospital Responsibility for
Malpractice of Physicians,50 WASH. L. Rv. 385 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice];Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 953 (1973); Note, Torts: The Expanding Liability of Hospitals, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 441 (1973).
20. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 (Colo. App. 1977); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 125 Ga.
App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964),
aff'd, 33 MII.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1976); Gridley v. Johnson, 476
S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173
N.W.2d 881 (1970); Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207,
495 P.2d 605 (1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d
534 (1975); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373
(1967); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (1980); Kahn v. Suburban
Hosp., 45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 340 N.E.2d 398 (1976); Tonsic v. Wagner, 220 Pa. Super. Ct.
468, 289 A.2d 138 (1972); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
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responsible for failure to take reasonable care in the selection
and retention of a staff physician. Relying on Darling, the
Georgia Supreme Court extended the hospital's duty to the
Misericordiasituation in Mitchell County Hospital Authority
v. Joiner.1 There a staff physician treated the plaintiff's husband in the emergency room for chest pains. The doctor gave
the husband a prescription and sent him home only to have
the patient die on his way back to the hospital that same day.
The plaintiff contended that the hospital had been negligent
in hiring the physician without investigating his background
and the court agreed that the mere fact that a physician is
licensed or recommended by someone on the staff does not
mean that he has been properly screened. Furthermore, the
staff members to whom the selection process was delegated
were agents of the hospital, so the hospital was not relieved of
responsibility for their actions if it knew or should have
known of the physician's incompetence. This duty does not
end when the physician is hired; it is a continuing process of
reviewing and monitoring. In arriving at its decision the court
explained:
[P]laintiff does not seek to hold the hospital liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior or principal and agent, but
upon the doctrine of independent negligence in permitting
the alleged negligent physician to practice his profession in
the hospital when his incompetency is known. Such negligence is comparable to that of the owner of a motor vehicle
permitting an incompetent, inexperienced,
or reckless driver
22
to operate such motor vehicle.

A similar result was reached by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Purcell v. Zimbelman.23 A patient's administratrix
sued a surgeon and Tucson General Hospital for harm caused
by a negligent operation for cancer of the colon. Dr. Purcell,
who held courtesy membership24 on the staff, did not obtain a
frozen section pathology report to indicate that cancer was ac21. 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972).

22. 229 Ga. at 141-42, 189 S.E.2d at 414.
23. 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
24. In general, a member of the courtesy staff is not involved at all in the operation of the hospital but is simply entitled to admit his patients to the hospital for
treatment by him.
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tually present, but performed surgery anyway. Other physicians testified at the trial that a procedure other than the one
employed by Dr. Purcell would have produced less injurious
results. The patient suffered loss of sexual function, loss of a
kidney, a permanent colostomy and urinary problems before
his death. Testimony also revealed that Dr. Purcell had been
sued four times previously (twice for performing the same operation attempted on Mr. Zimbelman) and that the hospital
was named as a defendant in all four prior suits. The court
concluded that the hospital had actual knowledge of Dr. Purcell's incompetence and should have acted to protect other patients from his ministrations. In reaching their decision the
court stated:
We believe it reasonably probable to conclude that had the
hospital taken some action against Dr. Purcell, whether in
the form of suspension, remonstration, restriction or other
means, the surgical procedure utilized in this case would not
have been undertaken by the doctor and Mr. Zimbelman
would not have been injured. 25
The trend of these cases is clear. Hospitals - institutions
which once enjoyed total tort immunity2 6 - could now potentially be liable for the negligence of a physician who had negligently been given staff privileges.

HI. ANALYSIS OF THE MiscericordiaDECISION
A.

Recognition of a Hospital's Duty of Care
In arriving at its decision in Misericordia the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled for the first time that Wisconsin hospitals have a duty "of reasonable care to permit only competent
physicians to use their facilities . . .
Such a duty arises
when the negligent party acts when some harm to someone is
foreseeable.28 As applied to this case the court reasoned that:
[T]he issue of whether Misericordia should be held to a duty
of due care in the granting of medical staff privileges de25. 18 Ariz. App. at -, 500 P.2d at 343.
26. See note 4 supra.
27. 99 Wis. 2d at 737, 301 N.W.2d at 171, quoting the trial court's instructions to
the jury.
28. See A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214 N.W.2d
764, 766 (1974).
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pends upon whether it is foreseeable that a hospital's failure
to properly investigate and verify the accuracy of an applicant's statements dealing with his training, experience and
qualifications as well as to weigh and pass judgment on the
applicant would prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to its
patients. The failure of a hospital to scrutinize the credentials of its medical staff applicants could foreseeably result
in the appointment of unqualified physicians and surgeons
to its staff. Thus, the granting of staff privileges to these
doctors would undoubtedly create an unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to their patients. Therefore, the failure to investigate a medical staff applicant's qualifications for the
privileges requested gives rise to a foreseeable risk of unreasonable harm and we hold that a hospital had a duty
to ex29
ercise due care in the selection of its medical staff.
B.

The Standard of Care

The supreme court in Misericordiaalso established guidelines for the standard of care a hospital must maintain. In
general, the standard of ordinary care under the circumstances applies to hospitals.30 There is no language in the
opinion to indicate that Wisconsin hospitals should be held to
a higher standard of care, as are common carriers or innkeepers. The supreme court stated that "for Misericordia to be liable for negligence in this case, it must have failed to exercise
that degree of care and skill required of a hospital under like
or similar circumstances." 1
The Wisconsin court had previously rejected the locality
32
rule in medical malpractice actions in Shier v. Freeman
where an orthopedic surgeon from Green Bay was held subject
to the standard of the "average practitioner in the class to
which he belongs,"33 rather than to the standard of other orthopedic surgeons in Green Bay. Geographic area and its attendant lack of facilities are now merely circumstances that
can be considered if appropriate.3 4 In Misericordia,therefore,
the court could apply a similar national standard to hospitals.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

99 Wis. 2d
Id. at 738,
Id.
58 Wis. 2d
Id. at 283,
Id. at 284,

at 723, 301 N.W.2d at 164.
301 N.W.2d at 171.
269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
206 N.W.2d at 174.
206 N.W.2d at 174.
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In arriving at this standard, both the court of appeals and the
supreme court used the phrase "average hospital.

35

However,

the Restatement (Second) of Torts uses the word "reasonable" instead of "average" because to base a standard on a true
average would mean that half of the members of a class would
automatically fall below the standard.36 In view of the rejection of the locality doctrine the use of an average at least
avoids the problem of the plaintiff introducing the standards
of the strictest hospital to be found or of the defendant producing the standards of the most lax institution. After studying diverse cases, one law review writer concluded that the
word "average" as applied to medical skills is usually used synonymously with "ordinary" learning and skill. He notes that
"a true 'average' would involve an uneasy aggregation of the
best and the worst, the experienced and the inexperienced,
the quack and the specializing medical doctor. It has never
been suggested that the law strikes the average from so diverse a grouping.

37

Elsewhere, the Misericordia decision

speaks of the standard of a "reputable hospital"3s - a more
subjective term, perhaps, but one less fraught with problems
35. 97 Wis. 2d at 544, 294 N.W.2d at 513, aff'd, 99 Wis. 2d at 742, 301 N.W.2d at
173.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). See also Schuster v. St. Vincent Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 135, 142, 172 N.W.2d 421, 423 (1969), saying that "reasonable"
care and "ordinary" care are synonymous terms.
37. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 408, 409 n.1 (1969). Some early commentators on
Darling feared that only the standards of the strictest hospitals would be used. See
Rapp, supra note 19, at 892. See also Expanding Duty, supra note 19, at 258-62.
Both of these articles contend that the Nebraska Supreme Court in Foley v. Bishop
Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970), suggested that the
most strict nationwide standards would set the standard of care, but the court actually stated:
In this case the evidence regarding standards of care prevailing in Omaha or
similar communities consists primarily of rules and regulations of the defendant hospital. This does not establish community standards which may be either more liberal or stricter than the standards set up by defendant. Although
pertinent, such evidence standing alone is insufficient.
Id. at -,
173 N.W.2d at 884. But see Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Sacramento
County, Super. Ct. of Cal., Nov. 19, 1973), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 60
Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976). In this case the trial court did not consider even full compliance with the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
to be adequate conduct when those procedures did not result in the discovery and
removal from the staff of a flagrantly incompetent surgeon.
38. 97 Wis. 2d at 544, 294 N.W.2d at 513.
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than "average."
Aside from the semantic problems, the Wisconsin courts
laid down specific criteria for determining the standard of
care in regard to staff selection. In Misericordia these factors
were intertwined with the type of proof needed to establish
the independent negligence of the hospital. Since the procedures ordinarily employed by hospitals in evaluating applications for staff privileges are not within the realm of the ordinary experience of mankind, expert testimony was required to
establish Misericordia's negligence.3 9 At trial, two Milwaukee
experts on hospital administration related the procedure for
screening applications for staff privileges. Both said that this
process involves checking the doctor's past associations with
colleagues and hospitals to test the veracity of his representations. A local board-certified orthopedist also described the
information concerning medical school, internship, residency
and certification which he had been required to produce for
the four hospitals that granted him privileges. In contrast, the
medical staff coordinator for Misericordia Hospital admitted
that no one at that hospital had made any investigation of Dr.
Salinsky's credentials, although that was the hospital's
avowed procedure. In the minutes of the Misericordia medical
staff meeting of June 21, 1973 (just one day after the administrator approved Dr. Salinsky's appointment to the staff), the
medical director noted that with regard to "the physician's
applications and approval of such, [it] was the responsibility
of the executive committee in lieu of a non-functioning credentials committee."" ° Thus, Misericordia's own bylaws were
used to establish the standard of care for the hospital. Usually, rules adopted by private organizations are irrelevant because the standard of care upon which recovery must be based
is set by law."1 In this case, however, the bylaws were a re-

39. 99 Wis. 2d at 739, 301 N.W.2d at 172. The court also quoted Payne v. Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 264, 275-76, 260 N.W.2d 386, 392 (1977):
In establishing the negligence of a hospital the necessity for expert testimony
depends upon the type of negligent acts involved. Expert testimony should be
adduced concerning those matters involving special knowledge or skill or experience on subjects which are not within the realm of the ordinary experience of
mankind and which require special learning, study or experience.
40. 97 Wis. 2d at 537 n.6, 294 N.W.2d at 510 n.6.
41. See Marolla v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 539, 547, 157
N.W.2d 674, 678 (1968).

19811
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quirement of licensing under the Wisconsin Administrative
Code and embody much of the code language. Misericordia's
bylaws incorporated the Wisconsin Administrative Code's
standards which apply uniformly to all licensed general hospitals. These bylaws, therefore, did not represent isolated safety
rules solely for Misericordia's internal use.
Besides the bylaws of the hospital and of other "reputable" hospitals, the Wisconsin court also allowed state statutes
and the Wisconsin Administrative Code itself to be introduced as evidence of a reasonable standard of conduct.,2 The
supreme court rejected Miscericordia's contention that these
rules merely impose a moral, not a legal, obligation on the
hospital. It was clear to the court that the legislature intended
to make the hospital's governing body legally responsible for*
the selection of the medical staff in order to promote the welfare of the patients. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the
statewide regulations along with the individual hospital's own
bylaws to insure that a negligent hospital would not be protected by adopting lax standards or that a nonnegligent hospital will not be harmed by a failure to attain its own unrealistically high standards.
In other cases, such as Darling,the rules of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals' were also relied upon
to establish the standard of care. These nationwide regulations place particular emphasis upon the appointment/reappointment procedure and a continuing process of evaluation
of each staff member." In this case, however, Misericordia
had not applied for JCAH approval. While the court notes
Misericordia's failure to do so, 4 5 the evidence produced at the

trial came only from state and local sources. This does not
exclude the possibility that JCAH regulations could be intro42. See Wis. ADM. CODE §§ H 24.02, .04 (1968). See also Wis. STAT. § 50.36 (1979).
43. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals [hereinafter cited as
JCAH] was organized in 1952 by the American Hospital Association, American Medical Association, American College of Physicians, American College of Surgeons, and
Canadian Hospital Association. It is a voluntary organization which sets minimum

standards for patient care. Federal programs participation as well as residency and
internship programs are often contingent upon JCAH approval. 99 Wis. 2d at 712 n.8,

301 N.W.2d at 159 n.8.
44. See generally JCAH AccRrrATON MANUAL FOR HosPrrALs (1976 & Supp.
1977).
45. 99 Wis. 2d at 712, 301 N.W.2d at 159.
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duced as evidence in an appropriate Wisconsin case. 41 It is not
clear, however, whether Wisconsin would go as far as the Darling decision, which admitted sources other than expert professional and administrative testimony to establish a hospital's standard of care.47 These sources constitute a whole new
field of evidence with which to determine the heretofore elusive hospital standard of care. Ideally, the comprehensiveness
of this material should provide a definitive guideline for
nearly every situation that might arise.4
Miscericordiafails to address whether a violation of a rule
from any of these sources would constitute negligence per se
on the part of the hospital. Legal commentators agree that
such a breach would not be conclusive on the question of liability.4 9 The breach must also have been a proximate or legal
cause of the injury to the patient. Nevertheless, as one writer
points out:
[I]n light of subsequent cases, it is evidence of negligence
which obviously weighs heavily upon the minds of the factfinder. Where the action is based upon a breach by a staff
physician, knowledge of the impending breach and a failure
to prevent it, or, in the absence of knowledge, circumstances
under which the hospital should have known, must be
demonstrated. When this is sufficiently demonstrated, liability appears almost certain.50

Another writer attributes the scarcity of case law on the subject of hospital corporate liability post-Darling to the
probability that when a hospital commits a clear-cut violation
of a state or federal regulation, an out of court settlement is
likely. 1
46. At least one source finds that JCAH rules create a national standard of care.
See 27 AM. JuR. Proof of Facts § 57 (1966).
47. 33 Ill. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
48. See Expanding Duty, supra note 19, at 257.
49. See, e.g., Dornette, The Legal Impact on Voluntary Standards in Civil Actions Against the Health Care Provider, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 925, 934-39 (1977).
See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 IMI.2d 326, 331-32,
211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). But see Pederson v.
Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 80, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967), in which breach of a hospital rule concerning the mandatory attendance of a physician in the operating room
during oral surgery was held to be negligence per se.
50. Expanding Duty, supra note 19, at 257.
51. Effective Solution, supra note 5, at 344 n.14.
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Had Misericordia followed any of the customary procedures in processing the application of Dr. Salinsky, it would
have found, contrary to his representations, that his surgical
privileges had been restricted at two hospitals and that he did
not have consultant privileges at two other hospitals he listed
as references. Furthermore, he was neither board certified nor
board eligible in the field of orthopedic surgery and he was
not considered competent by many of his peers. Moreover, Dr.
Salinsky failed to answer any of the questions pertaining to
his malpractice insurance and Misericordia failed to check the
Milwaukee County Circuit Court files where seven malpractice actions had been filed against him prior to his appointment to the Misericordia staff.
While Dr. Salinsky's incompetence at the time of his application of Misericordia was clear, the supreme court did not
limit its decision to situations where the court knew or should
have known of such incompetence:
[W]e do not adopt the legal theory that knowledge of incompetency is the standard for determining whether a hospital
exercised due care in selecting its staff.
...

Thus, the defendant's claim that the plaintiff had

the burden of showing that Salinsky was actually incompetent and that the hospital knew or should have known of his
incompetence before granting him surgical privileges before
the July 11, 1975, operation is in error, as we hold that
Johnson was only obliged to prove that Misericordia did
Salinnot make a reasonable effort to determine whether
52
sky was qualified to perform orthopedic surgery.

In Misericordiathere was no evidence that the hospital had
actual knowledge of the surgeon's incompetence as in Purcell;5" but in view of the availability and multiplicity of such
information, Misericordia was charged with constructive
knowledge." The court concluded that a reasonable hospital
with knowledge of these facts would have excluded Dr. Salinsky from its staff. Thus, the supreme court affirmed that Mis52. 99 Wis. 2d at 737-39, 301 N.W.2d at 171-72 (emphasis in original).
500 P.2d at 340.
53. 18 Ariz. App. at -

54. See Attoe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 539, 546, 153 N.W.2d
575, 579 (1967): "Constructive knowledge is that knowledge which one who has the
opportunity, by the exercise of ordinary care, to possess."
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ericordia breached the standard of care it owed to its patients
and that this breach had been a substantial factor in causing
the physical harm to the plaintiff. The jury verdict and apportionment of negligence was upheld and the theory of the corporate negligence of hospitals was adopted by the Wisconsin
courts.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION

In the wake of Misericordia,Wisconsin health care providers are naturally concerned as to whether courts will strictly
or liberally construe the case's holding. Just how egregious the
facts must be before a breach of duty is found remains to be
seen. Misericordiawas a flagrant case of hospital misfeasance
which the plaintiff's attorney characterized as "the type of
conduct which used to be called 'gross negligence,' and constitutes a blatant disregard for the plaintiff's rights." 55 All of the
cases which followed Darling also arose out of factual situations indicative of gross negligence. While Wisconsin no
longer recognizes gross negligence as a distinct kind of negligence,56 the concept can still be employed when it indicates a
difference in degree but not in kind.5"
Another extraordinary feature of this case which might
distinguish it from others on its facts is the close connection
of the negligent physician with the governing board of the
hospital. Dr. Salinsky was not merely a staff physician.
Shortly after his appointment to the medical staff was approved by the hospital administrator, he was elevated to the
position of chief of staff; thus he endorsed his own appointment which was marked approved about two months later. Indeed, he was listed as a member of the executive committee
before his appointment was approved.58 The closeness of the
governing body and the medical staff was further underscored
by the fact that the hospital itself was owned by three staff
physicians.5 9

55. Brief for Respondent at 5, 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
56. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 14-19, 114 N.W.2d 105, 111-14 (1962).
57. See Vivian v. Examining Bd. of Architects, 61 Wis. 2d 627, 637-40, 213
N.W.2d 359, 364-65 (1974). See also Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice,supra
note 19, at 414-15.
58. 99 Wis. 2d at 713-14, 301 N.W.2d at 159-60.
59. Id. at 711, 301 N.W.2d at 158.
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There is no language in Misericordia to indicate that the
hospital's liability should not be based on at least some degree
of fault. In this case it was the salient fault of the hospital
which led the jury to apportion eighty percent of the negligence to Misericordia. Yet the court said that hospitals are
not "insurers of the competence of their medical staff, for a
hospital will not be negligent if it exercises the noted standard
of care in selecting its staff."60 Courts in the future, however,
could decide to hold a hospital strictly liable for the acts of
any practitioner within its walls. 1 Some commentators see
this as a more efficient way to handle costly and complicated
hospital-based malpractice actions.2
A more immediate probable impact of the Misericordia
decision will be an increase in lawsuits which name the hospital as a defendant. The hospital is another deep pocket from
which the plaintiff may be able to recover. This additional
source of revenue could be especially important where the
physician has limited or exhausted malpractice coverage or
where the damages exceed his maximum coverage. 3 Under
Wisconsin's system of comparative negligence, the hospital as
a joint tortfeasor would be jointly and severally liable for all
damages or would be liable for the proportion not settled by a
release of the doctor. Under the Wisconsin system of contribution, if the doctor had settled for more than his apportioned share of negligence with a Pierringer-type release
(which settles for whatever percentage is later attributed to
the tortfeasor by the jury), 4 the physician's insurer could
claim contribution from the hospital. Similarly, if the hospital
settled before trial for more than its share of the damages, it
could obtain contribution from the physician's insurer.

60. Id. at 745, 301 N.W.2d at 175.
61. See Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 IlM. 2d 282, 415 N.E.2d 390 (1980),
where the hospital was held strictly liable for a patient developing cancer after a
hospital physician had administered x-ray treatments to correct a thyroid condition.
See also Expanding Duty, supra note 19, at 255 n.33, 261; Needed Legal Sutures,
supra note 19, at 855 n.94.
62. See, e.g., Effective Solution, supra note 5, at 353-54.
63. In Wisconsin all physicians must be insured or be self-insured or furnish a
surety bond and must participate in a patient compensation fund which covers all
claims which exceed the individual's insurance. Wis. STAT. §§ 655.23, 655.27(1),
(5)(a), (5)(d) (1979).
64. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
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Hospitals might also encounter difficulty when their duty
to scrutinize staff appointments comes into conflict with the
physician's right to practice.6 5 As a witness for Misericordia
Hospital pointed out at the trial, the opinions of other doctors
and administrators may be colored by personal aid professional jealously, animosity or medical politics.6 6 There is also a
danger that a hospital could use a decision such as Misericordia to justify excluding a physician from the staff when the
underlying motive is based on the applicant's race, sex or religion. Individuals, of course, can invoke their due process
rights under the fourteenth amendment; so it is a risk hospitals and doctors alike will have to endure to insure the nonnegligent care of patients.6
The minimum standards set forth in Misericordiaare sufficiently specific to give definite guidance to concerned hospitals and yet are not so rigid that each case could not be considered on its merits. For example, a rule automatically
excluding a physician from the staff after being named in a
certain number of malpractice suits would not be appropriate,
because all suits do not necessarily result in judgments and
others are settled out of court. Sometimes it is less costly for
an insurance company to settle such a claim regardless of
whether the physician was negligent, so even a settlement is
not necessarily indicative of the doctor's competence.6 8
In the future, hospitals should have a more qualified pool
of specialists to fill their staff openings, since the Bureau of
Labor Statistics reports that the number of physicians certified in most specialties is increasing at a faster rate than the
general population. 9 Also, many states, such as Wisconsin,
now require continuing education as a prerequisite to license
renewal.70 At the same time, governmental agencies are at-

65. See Levin, Doctors Sue Hospitals for Staff Privileges as Competition Rises,
Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
66. 99 Wis. 2d at 720-21, 301 N.W.2d at 163.
67. See Rapp, supra note 19, at 890. See generally Comment, Hospital Medical
Staff Privileges:Recent Developments in ProceduralDue Process Requirements, 12
WILLAmEr L.J. 137, (1975).
68. See Effective Solution, supra note 5, at 350-53.
69. CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN MdEDIcAL AssOCIATION, PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION AND MEDICAL LICENSURE IN THE UNITED
STATES 388 (1979).
70. Wis. STAT. § 448.13 (1979). But see Effective Solution, supra note 19, at 350.
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tempting to phase out marginal hospitals.7 1 The problem of
the flagrantly negligent physician or hospital will never be totally eradicated, however, since it is not always the substan-

dard practitioner or institution which will fail in its duties to
its patients.

72

V.

CONCLUSION

Misericordiashould at a minimum serve as both a warning
and a guide to Wisconsin health care providers who wish to
avoid future liability.7 3 The days of total immunity have long
71. Misericordia itself closed in 1977 due to bankruptcy.
72. See TIME, July 20, 1981, at 72, reporting on the recent filing of 20 lawsuits
against the University of California Davis Medical Center which the article says "was
increasingly cited for excellent patient care and impressive research." The complaints
contend that the hospital was negligent in allowing a "grossly incompetent" kidney
transplant surgeon to operate at the center.
73. 99 Wis. 2d at 744-45, 301 N.W.2d at 174-75, which recapitulates the standard
thus:
In summary, we hold that a hospital owes a duty to its patients to exercise
reasonable care in the selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized
privileges. The final appointing authority resides in the hospital's governing
body, although it must rely on the medical staff and in particular the credentials committee (or committee of the whole) to investigate and evaluate an applicant's qualifications for the requested privileges. However, this delegation of
the responsibility to investigate and evaluate the professional competence of
applicants for clinical privileges does not relieve the governing body of its duty
to appoint only qualified physicians and surgeons to its medical staff and periodically monitor and review their competency. The credentials committee (or
committee of the whole) must investigate the qualifications of applicants. The
facts of this case demonstrate that a hospital should, at a minimum, require
completion of the application and verify the accuracy of the applicant's statements, training and experience. Additionally, it should: (1) solicit information
from the applicant's peers, including those not referenced in his application,
who are knowledgeable about his education, training, experience, health, competence and ethical character; (2) determine if the applicant is currently licensed to practice in this state and if his licensure or registration has been or is
currently being challenged; and (3) inquire whether the applicant has been involved in any adverse malpractice action and whether he has experienced a
loss of medical organization membership or medical privileges or membership
at any other hospital. The investigating committee must also evaluate the information gained through its inquiries and make a reasonable judgment as to
the approval of denial of each application for staff privileges. The hospital will
be charged with gaining and evaluating the knowledge that would have been
acquired had it exercised ordinary care in investigating its medical staff applicants and the hospital's failure to exercise that degree of care, skill and judgment that is exercised by the average hospital in approving an applicant's request for privileges is negligence.
(footnotes omitted)
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since passed, but the burden of corporate responsibility is
neither new nor oppressive. The court in Misericordia relied
on fifteen years of prior decisions and legal scholarship in
shaping its opinion. Its conclusion was a logical outgrowth of
the public's perception of the hospital as the primary dispenser of all but the most routine medical services. People
have come to expect a degree of protection from the providers
they patronize. This decision does not place a greater burden
upon hospitals than they themselves should have assumed in
their own bylaws and under state regulations and the rules of
voluntary associations. In making this determination the court
did not abrogate an existing principle of tort or agency law,
but simply found another path to what it perceived to be a
just result. This result places the burden of risk management
upon the hospital, the party which is now best able to protect
the patient from harm.
JACQUELINE HANSON DEE

MENTAL HEALTH LAW - 42 U.S.C. § 6010 Held
Not to Create Substantive Rights in Favor of Mentally Retarded. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,
101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981). Although in the last decade courts
across the country have endorsed a right to treatment and to
community services under a variety of statutory and constitutional theories, none of these holdings has been affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, the Supreme
Court's decision in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman1
was awaited by mental health advocates with great interest
and some anxiety. The Court, however, limited its holding to
a statutory interpretation, namely that section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 2 did
not create in favor of the mentally retarded any substantive
rights to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment, and effectively sidestepped the constitutional issues. Such a narrow decision may well leave existing,
favorable constitutional precedent intact.
1. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (Supp. V. 1975).

